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The Goldenberg-Vaidman (GV) protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD) uses orthogonal
encoding states of a particle. Its security arises because operations accessible to Eve are insufficient to
distinguish the two states encoding the secret bit. We propose a two-particle cryptographic protocol
for quantum secure direct communication, wherein orthogonal states encode the secret, and security
arises from restricting Eve from accessing any two-particle operations. However, there is a non-trivial
difference between the two cases. While the encoding states are perfectly indistinguishable in GV,
they are partially distinguishable in the bi-partite case, leading to a qualitatively different kind of
information-vs-disturbance trade-off and also options for Eve in the two cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in device-independent quantum cryptography [1] have brought to the fore the relevance of multi-
particle systems in quantum cryptography, following a line of thought first initiated by Ekert [2]. In response to
this work, Ref. [3] proposed a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme based on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
correlations, which was equivalent to the original Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [4] protocol for QKD, but uses
separable particles instead of entangled ones. The argument of Ref. [3] would suggest that the security features of
EPR were reflected in BB84. A similar relation exists arguably between the Ping-pong [5] on the one hand, and
DL04-QSDC [6] or Lucamarini-Mancini 2005 (LM05) [7] protocols, on the other, in the sense that the former may be
considered as the entangled version of the latter.
All the separable-state protocols discussed above, BB84, DL04-QSDC and LM05, employ non-orthogonal states,
whose perfect indistinguishability lies at the heart of their security. Further, perfect indistinguishability of non-
orthogonal states also provides security to many other protocols of QKD, such as B92 [8] and DL04-QKD [9] protocols.
By contrast, Goldenberg and Vaidman [10] proposed a protocol (GV), demonstrating that secure cryptography can
be accomplished even with orthogonal states. The key point was that they were superpositions of geographically
separated wave packets. Secrecy in this case arises because of the set of operations Eve can apply are restricted by
quantum mechanics.
Most of the early protocols [2, 4, 8] of quantum cryptography were limited to QKD. Specifically, these quantum
cryptographic protocols are designed to generate an unconditionally secure random key by quantum means and subse-
quently classical cryptographic procedures are used to encode the message using the key generated by these protocols.
Interestingly, later protocols for secure communiation [11, 12] were proposed that allow to either generate a determin-
istic key or to circumvent the prior generation of key. These protocols of secure direct quantum communication can
broadly be divided into three sub-classes: (i) Deterministic QKD protocols [5, 7, 10]; (ii) protocols for deterministic
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2secure quantum communication (DSQC) [11–13]; and finally, (iii) protocols for quantum secure direct communication
(QSDC) [6].
In deterministic QKD and DSQC, there is some information leakage of classical data prior to detection of eavesdrop-
ping by Eve. Deterministic QKD solves this problem by transmitting a random key, rather than the secret message.
In DSQC, the receiver (Bob) can decode the message only after receipt of an encoding key, which is some additional
classical information (at least one bit for each qubit transmitted by the sender (Alice)). Thus in the event of leakage
detection, the encoding key is not published, in order to protect the message.
In contrast to DSQC, when no such additional classical information is required, a direct secure quantum commu-
nication of the message can be achieved, which happens in a QSDC protocol. Protocols of DSQC and QSDC are
interesting for various reasons. Firstly, a conventional QKD-based quantum communication protocol uses a classi-
cal intermediate step to transmit the message, but no such classical intermediary is required in DSQC and QSDC.
Further, a QSDC or DSQC protocol can always be turned into a protocol of QKD as the sender who is capable of
communicating a meaningful message can also choose to communicate a random string of bits to convert the protocol
into a protocol of QKD. However, the converse is not true (i.e., a QKD protocol cannot be used as a protocol of
QSDC or DSQC).
In this work, we consider an orthogonal-state based quantum cryptography protocol that uses two-particle entan-
glement. By transmitting the two particles separately, we obtain security because the set of states distinguishable
via the accessible operations to Eve fail to distinguish the encoding states. As in GV, our protocol requires delayed
measurement on the first particle in order to work. (Therefore, from a practical perspective, quantum memory, an
expensive resource, is required). By contrast, for non-orthogonal-state based protocols, delayed measurement is re-
placed by random measurement choice, but can be used to improve efficiency [14]. An important difference with
the single-particle case is the degree of distinguishability, thus making the proof of security quite different in the
two-particle case. Further, our use of block transmission and an order-rearrangement technique makes the protocol
suitable for QSDC, while GV is a protocol for QKD.
In GV, both the encoding states as well as error-checking states involve only orthogonal states, while in BB84, both
types of states are non-orthogonal. More generally, one may consider cryptography protocols that involve orthogonal-
state encoding but allow conjugate coding for error-checking [15–19]. Using the strategy adopted for eavesdropping
checking in the protocol proposed in the present paper it is possible to modify these protocols [15–19] into equivalent
completely orthogonal-state-based protocols.
II. THE GV PROTOCOL AND ITS SECURITY
We briefly review GV. Alice and Bob are located at two ends of a large Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Let |U(t)〉 and
|L(t)〉 be two localized wave packets of Alice’s particle S, travelling by the upper and lower arm of the interferometer,
respectively. Classical bit j(= 0, 1) is encoded as:
|Ψj〉 = 1√
2
(|U(ts)〉+ (−1)j |L(ts)〉) , (1)
where it is assumed that there is no overlap between the supports of {|U(t)〉} and {|L(t)〉}. Alice sends Bob either
|Ψ0〉 or |Ψ1〉 by delaying packet L by time ∆ to ensure that |U〉 and |L〉 are not present in the channel at the same
time. In his station, Bob receives |U(ts + τ)〉, where τ is the travel time of the pulse from Alice’s to Bob’s station.
Bob puts the pulse on hold for time ∆ (where τ < ∆), before combining it with |L(ts + ∆ + τ)〉, to recreate the
superposition state |Ψ′j〉, which is the same as |Ψj〉, apart from an inconsequential global phase. Bob then decodes
bit j deterministically from his interferometric output.
Alice and Bob perform the following two tests to detect Eve’s possible malicious eavesdropping: (1) They compare
the sending time ts with the receiving time tr for each wave packet. We must have tr = ts + τ + ∆. This ensures that
Eve cannot delay the upper packet until also having lower packet simultaneously, which would allow her to decode the
states. Even so, she may replace both wave packets with a corresponding dummy. To avoid such an attack, the timing
of transmission of particles is kept random. To faciliatate this, Alice and Bob discretize their sending times into a
sequence of time bins. (2) Alice selects a fraction of particles and announces their time coordinates. Bob announces
his measurement outcomes on them. Alice ensures that his received bits are consistent with her transmitted bits.
The security of GV can be understood in terms of an extended no-cloning theorem applicable to orthogonal states,
when Eve’s operations are restricted by the fact that she can physically access only one of the pieces |U(t)〉 and |L(t)〉
at a given time [20]. We present a slightly different version, amenable to subsequent generalization.
The simplest operation accessible is a projective measurement onto the basis {|U(t)〉, |L(t)〉}, where we may ignore
the time-dependence for convenience. If Eve measures projectively in this basis, she merely disrupts the coherence
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FIG. 1: Bob’s information (IB , falling dashed curve) and Eve’s information (IE , rising line), respectively, as a function of
eavesdropping parameters observed error e. For e ≥ emax ≡ 0.26, IE > IB . The falling line corresponds to the positive key rate
(7).
between the wave packets and is detected, but obtains no information about the secret bit j. More generally, Eve can
introduce a probe P that interacts with Alice’s particle according to:
U ≡ |U〉〈U | ⊗ CU + |L〉〈L| ⊗ CL, (2)
where CU and CL are unitaries acting on the ancilla alone. Because the two packets are never together on the channel,
causality demands that Eve’s attack cannot unitarily mix the U and L pieces. An implication is that no attack by
Eve, which is confined to the form (2), can extract secret bit j, because this is stored as the phase information between
the two wave packets, and cannot be accessed even probabilistically. We prove this below.
Let |R〉 be the initial ‘ready’ state of the probe. Acting on the particle-probe system, Eq. (2) transforms an initial
state |Ψj〉 ⊗ |R〉, after they are recombined by Bob, to the state
ρSP =
1
4
 |u〉〈u| (−1)j |d〉〈u|
(−1)j |u〉〈d| |d〉〈d|
 , (3)
where |u〉 ≡ C0|R〉 and |d〉 = C1|R〉. The probe is now left in the state:
ρ′P = TrS(ρSP ) =
1
2
(|d〉〈d|+ |u〉〈u|), (4)
which, as with the case of projective measurements, yields no information to Eve about the secret bit j. In other
words, Eve gains nothing by attacking in the case of individual attacks. It is not difficult to see that this is also true
for Eve’s collective and joint attacks.
Assuming ideal single-photon sources and detectors with Alice and Bob, the only way for Eve to attack the GV
protocol, is that she substitutes dummies by blocking fraction f of the genuine particles. Suppose that Alice and
Bob agree to discretize the random sending time. In each sequential block of γ (an integer) number of time steps,
one particle is transmitted by Alice in a randomly chosen time cell within the block. Eve’s strategy would be to fully
blockade a fraction f of randomly chosen blocks, and transmit a dummy prepared by her in a randomly chosen time
within the block. The probability that she gets a match with Alice’s transmission cell is 1/γ.
To calculate the error rate Eve generates, we note that even when Eve gets the timing right, she will be wrong half
the time about the encoded state. Thus Eve generates error rate
e = f ×
[
1
2
1
γ
+
(
1− 1
γ
)]
= f ×
(
1− 1
2γ
)
, (5)
where γ is a publicly known number. Bob’s average information on the sifted bits is given IB ≡ I(A : B) = 1− h(e),
where h(·) is the binary Shannon information. On the dummies whose timing is right, Eve has full information, i.e.,
I(A : E) = I(B : E) ≡ IE = f
γ
=
2e
2γ − 1 , (6)
4where the last equation follows from Eq. (5) and the I(A : E) and I(B : E) denote Eve’s mutual information on Alice
and Bob. She knows when she got it right when Alice and Bob perform the equivalent of basis reconciliation for the
sending times.
The corresponding data is plotted in Figure 1. The requirement for positive secret key rate is determined by [21]
K ≡ IB −min(I(A : E), I(A : B)) = IB − IE , (7)
from which the maximum tolerable error is found to be emax ≈ 0.26.
III. TOWARDS A TWO-PARTICLE ORTHOGONAL-STATE BASED PROTOCOL
In seeking a protocol that extends GV to a two-particle (or multi-particle) scenario, we are naturally led to consider
cryptographic adaption of quantum dense coding to cryptography (cf. the protocol of Ref. [22] for dense coding based
secure direct communication.) On the analogy of GV, one might expect that Alice should transmit the two entangled
particles one after another at random timings and such that both are not found on the open channel. Surprisingly,
this can be completely insecure against Eve, whose strategy would be as follows. When the first particle comes,
she holds it, and transmits her own half of a Bell state towards Bob. She can in principle find out the position of
the randomly sent second particle, measure it jointly with Alice’s first particle, determine their joint state, and then
transmit a dummy particle appropriately entangled with her first dummy particle. Here we have assumed that Eve’s
measurements take negligible time.
To avoid this attack, such bi-partite cryptographic protocols may add multi-partite non-orthogonal states either to
the coding or in the checking step (as in BB84). However, if we remain restricted to orthogonal states, then the order
of particles needs to be scrambled, via the permutation of particle (PoP) action, an idea first introduced by Deng and
Long in 2003 in a pioneering work [23] on the “controlled order rearrangement encryption” (CORE) QKD protocol.
In the present work, a two-particle QSDC protocol inspired by GV, which is referred to as 2GV, is presented along
these lines in the next section.
Now suppose Eve does not launch the dummy particle attack. Assuming ideal sources and detectors, GV is secure.
Interestingly, a bipartite generalization of GV (without PoP) is not. The reason is interesting and highlights a
difference between single- and bi-partite nonlocality: while Eve gets no information on the encoded bits when the two
packets are de-synchronized, in the bipartite case, partial information can be obtained, as detailed below.
Alice and Bob employ a key distribution protocol where the key is shared via a dense coding strategy, and must
test for Eve after the transmissions are completed. Alice and Bob need to model Eve’s attack strategy, and estimate
whether Eve’s information on their secret bits, as a function of observed noise, is too high to be eliminated by
subsequent classical post-processing. If it is, only then do they abort the protocol run. We furnish a security proof
of the protocol, assuming individual attacks by Eve on each of the two coding particles. From this we extract an
information-vs-disturbance trade-off, and hence determine the largest tolerable error rate.
As a specific example of the attack employed by Eve, we consider a model given in Ref. [24], which is based on one
proposed by Niu and Griffiths [25]. Probes E0 an E1 interact with each transmitted qubit, being subjected to the
interaction:
|0〉|E〉 →
√
1 + cos θ
2
|0〉|0〉+
√
1− cos θ
2
|1〉|E0〉
|1〉|E〉 →
√
1 + cos θ
2
|1〉|1〉+
√
1− cos θ
2
|0〉|E1〉, (8)
where, furthermore 〈0|1〉 = 〈E0|E1〉 = cos θ by virtue of symmetry in the attack strategy. For simplicity, the same
attack parameter θ is assumed to characterize the attack on both particles. This results in the initial state ρAB , which
is a Bell state in 2GV, evolving into a joint state of the particles and probes, ρ′′ABE1E2 .
After some straightforward calculation, the above attack can be shown to produce the reduced density operator
ρ′′AB = TrE1E2
(
ρ′′ABE1E2
)
=

1
2 (1 + cos
2 θ) 0 0 12 (1 + cos
2 θ) cos2 θ
0 12 sin
2 θ 12 sin
2 θ cos2 θ 0
0 12 sin
2 θ cos2 θ 12 sin
2 θ 0
1
2 (1 + cos
2 θ) cos2 θ 0 0 12 (1 + cos
2 θ)
 . (9)
The quality of state received by Bob can be quantified by the fidelity 〈Φ+|ρ′′AB |Φ+〉 = (1 + cos2 θ)2 (where we assume
ρAB = |Φ+〉〈Φ+|). It follows that in order to produce no errors, Eve must ensure that θ = 0, which by virtue of Eq.
(8), implies that no entanglement is generated, and in fact |0〉 = |1〉, implying a trivial interaction of the probe with
5FIG. 2: (A) Bob’s information as a function of eavesdropping parameters θ (overlap angle, defined by Eq. (8)) and λ (fraction
of particle pairs attacked); (B) Eve’s information as a function of the same parameters.
Alice’s qubit. Thus, if no errors are generated, then Eve gains no information. More generally, suppose finite errors
are observed.
The error rate observed by Alice and Bob is given by:
e = 1− 〈Φ|ρ′AB |Φ〉 (10)
where |Φ ∈ {Φ±〉, |Ψ±〉} and
ρ′AB(θ, λ) = (1− λ)|Φ〉〈Φ|+ λρ′′AB (11)
is the corresponding two-particle state obtained assuming Eve attacks fraction λ of the incoming particle pairs with
eavesdropping parameter θ as defined in Eq. (8). Bob’s information IB is quantified as the Alice-Bob mutual
information IB ≡ I(A : B) when Bob measures the incoming states in the Bell basis. As a function of θ, λ, it is:
IB(θ, λ) = H(A)−H(A′(θ, λ)|B = Φ), (12)
where H(A) is Alice’s preparation entropy and H(A′(θ, λ)|B = Φ) is the conditional entropy of ρ′AB(θ, λ) when Bob
measures in the Bell basis. The quantity is presented in Fig. 2A as a function of Eve’s attack parameters.
Eve’s information IE ≡ I(A : E) = I(A : B) is upper-bounded by the Holevo bound χ of the reduced density
operator of the two probes:
χ = S
∑
j
pjρ
′(j)
E1E2
−∑
j
S
(
ρ
′(j)
E1E2
)
≥ IE(θ, λ), (13)
where ρ
′(j)
E1E2
(j = 0, 1, 2, 3) is the noisy version of the density operator corresponding to the four Bell states |Φ±〉, |Ψ±〉,
respectively, being sent by Alice. This bound on Eve’s information is depicted in Fig. 2B. Using the following notation:
c ≡ cos(θ), s ≡ sin(θ),K ≡ 12 (1 + c), A ≡ K2c2s2, B ≡ K2c3s, C ≡ K2s3c, D ≡ 14s3c3, E ≡ 14s4c2, F ≡ 14s3c2,
H ≡ K2(1 + c4), I ≡ 14 (1 + c2)s2c, J ≡ 14s4c, L ≡ 14s2(1 + c4), M ≡ 14s3, N ≡ 14s5c, P ≡ (1−K)2cs, Q ≡ (1−K)2s2,
6FIG. 3: Plot of error (10) for which a positive key rate (7) exists according to the data of Figure 2. This is the plot of e = e(θ, λ),
which is truncated over the region where IAE > IAB . The maximum tolerable error is the minimum across the ‘cliff’ (cf. Eq.
(15)
R ≡ 2(1−K)2c2, we find that if Alice transmits states |Φ±〉, then the corresponding probe states of Eve are:
ρ±E1E2 =

H B 0 0 B A 0 0 0 0 ±I ±M 0 0 ±F 0
B A 0 0 A C 0 0 0 0 ±F 0 0 0 ±J 0
0 0 L D 0 0 D E ±I ±M 0 0 ±F 0 0 0
0 0 D E 0 0 E N ±F 0 0 0 ±J 0 0 0
B A 0 0 A C 0 0 0 0 ±F 0 0 0 ±J 0
A C 0 0 C K2s4 0 0 0 0 ±J 0 0 0 ± 14s5 0
0 0 D E 0 0 E N ±F 0 0 0 ±J 0 0 0
0 0 E N 0 0 N 14s
6 ±J 0 0 0 ± 14s5 0 0 0
0 0 ±I ±F 0 0 ±F ±J 12s2c2 Mc 0 0 Mc 0 0 0
0 0 ±M 0 0 0 0 0 Mc 14s4 0 0 0 0 0 0±I ±F 0 0 ±F ±J 0 0 0 0 R P 0 0 P 0
±M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P Q 0 0 0 0
0 0 ±F ±J 0 0 ±J ± 14s5 Mc 0 0 0 14s4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
±F ±J 0 0 ±J ± 14s5 0 0 0 0 P 0 0 0 Q 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

. (14)
It is immediately seen that ρ+E1E2 and ρ
−
E1E2
are not identical, implying that Eve can gain some information about
Alice’s transmission by distinguishing ρ±E1E2 . This encoding-dependence of Eve’s probe state in 2GV is in stark
contrast to the general probe state (4) obtained when Eve attacks GV. Thus Eve’s attack in 2GV can obtain partial
information about the encoding, whereas she obtains none in the case of GV, even when no dummy states are used.
Therefore, unlike with GV, in the case of there is an information-vs-disturbance trade-off even when Eve employs no
dummy particles.
The tolerable error rate is computed as:
e0 = min
IB−χ=0
e, (15)
the smallest error for which χ just exceeds IB . It may be considered as the problem of minimizing e subject to
the constraint that Eve’s information has zero excess over Bob’s. Numerically, applying the criterion (15) to the
information-vs-disturbance trade-off data in Figures 2, we found the tolerable error rate e0 = 26.7%, as plotted in
Figure 3. This rather large tolerance can be attributed to the limited power of Eve’s attack here.
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FIG. 4: Illustration of the quantum information processing steps of the new protocol, where we indicate the block transmission
of qubits (cf. Ref. [15]) (a) Step 1 of the new protocol, where Alice transmits qubits of the set S
(b)
2 (2n) qubits and set S1 (2n
qubits) to Bob, after permuting them using operation Π4n (indicated as the dashed box); (b) Step 2 of the protocol, where
Bob performs a Bell-state measurement on the S1 qubits, after reordering them based on coordinate information received from
Alice; the particles of S
(b)
2 still remain permuted (dashed box); (c) Step 3, where Alice sends the n qubits used for verification,
and n used for transmitting a random key, along with the required coordinate information. After these three steps Alice and
Bob collaborate to check eavesdropping in Step 4 and finally in Step 5 Bob performs Bell measurements to obtain the shared
key (Steps 4 and 5 are not shown in this figure).
IV. TWO-PARTICLE ORTHOGONAL-STATE BASED PROTOCOL
Instead of random transmission, Alice transmits multiple halves of Bell states, and scrambles the order of the second
halves. In realistic protocols, there will be inevitable noise. As is usually done, any error observed by Alice and Bob
is attributed to a putative Eve’s intervention, though errors can arise also due to channel noise, too. The presented
scheme enumerated below uses this idea of re-ordering or permutation of particle order. An illustration of the protocol
is given in Figure 4.
1. Alice prepares the state |Ψ+〉⊗3n where |Ψ+〉 = |00〉+|11〉√
2
. She divides them into two sets: set S1 of n pairs and
set S2 of 2n pairs. Let S
(a)
j denote the first half (jn qubits) of set Sj , and S
(b)
j denote the second half of set
Sj . She keeps S
(a)
2 with herself (2n qubits). On the remaining 4n qubits of S1 ∪ S(b)2 , she applies a random
permutation operation Π4n and transmits them to Bob; 2n of the transmitted qubits are Bell pairs (the members
of S1) while the remaining 2n (the members of S
(b)
2 ) are the entangled partners of the particles remaining with
Alice.
2. After receiving Bob’s authenticated acknowledgment, Alice classically announces the coordinates of the 2n
members of S1 among the transmitted particles. Bob measures them in the Bell basis to determine if they are
each in the state |Ψ+〉. If the error detected by Bob is within a tolerable limit, they continue to the next step.
Otherwise, they discard the protocol and restart from Step 1.
3. Alice randomly chooses a sequence of n qubits from the set S
(a)
2 in her possession to form the verificiation string
Σ
(a|V )
2 for the next round of communication, and encodes her key in the remaining n qubits of S
(a)
2 to form the
code string Σ
(a|C)
2 . To encode a 2-bit message or key, Alice applies one of the 4 Pauli (dense coding) operations
I,X, iY, Z on her qubit. After the encoding operation, Alice sends all qubits in her possession (i.e., S
(a)
2 ) to
Bob.
4. Alice discloses the coordinates of the verification qubits (Σ
(a|V )
2 ) and their partner particles after receiving
authenticated acknowledgement of receipt of all the qubits from Bob. Bob performs Bell measurement on the
verification qubits and their partner particles and computes the error rate as in Step 2.
85. If the error rate is tolerably low, then Alice announces the coordinates of the partner partcles of Σ
(a|C)
2 and Bob
uses that information to decode the encoded message or key via a Bell-state measurement on the remaining Bell
pairs, and classical post-processing.
2GV may be considered as the bi-partite generalization of GV because the encoding is via orthogonal states, and
security arises because the encoding states cannot be distinguished by the restricted operations available to Eve.
However, there are three important differences. First is, as noted above, that randomizing the transmission schedule
of Alice’s particle does not help. More importantly, whereas geographic separation forbids Eve’s attack in GV from
unitarily mixing the states |U〉 and |L〉, in 2GV, where the encoding states are based on internal degrees of freedom,
the attack can mix encoding states. Thus, there is no bar on Eve’s accessing the coherence between the particles,
to gain partial information about the Bell state being sent even when restricted to attack on single particles. Thus,
unlike in GV, there is an information versus disturbance trade-off even when Eve does not use dummy particles, which
we discuss below.
Lastly, our protocol satisfies the stronger QSDC security requirement, while GV in its original form is a protocol
for deterministic QKD which cannot be used for QSDC, but can be used for DSQC [26]. This can be understood
clearly by considering that Alice sends a meaningful message to Bob by transmitting a sequence of |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉
using the original GV protocol. In this situation, when Alice sends |U〉 then Eve can keep it with her and substitute
it by a fake |U〉 and send that to Bob without causing any delay. Later, when |L〉 is sent by Alice then also Eve will
keep that with her and send a fake |L〉 to Bob. Eve can now appropriately superpose |U〉 and |L〉 and obtain the
meaningful information (message) encoded by Alice. To prevent this, Alice randomizes her transmission schedule.
Eve can still block particles and decode the random bits, but she will be eventually caught when Alice and Bob
compare the sending and receiving times. The point is that GV works by streaming qubits. Thus by the time she
is caught, the encoded information will have already been leaked. This leakage is not a problem with GV protocol
(QKD), because if Eve’s interference is too high, Alice and Bob will not use that key for any future encryption. In
contrast to GV, our protocol uses particle order arrangement in place of time schedule randomization, and further,
we use block transmission [15] in place of stream transmission. As a result, eavesdropping does not reveal information
as the coordinates of the partner particles of the information encoded qubits are announced only at the last step of
the protocol, i.e., after confirming that no eavesdropping has happened in the second step of communication when
Σ
(a|V )
2 and Σ
(a|C)
2 are communicated. Clearly the proposed cryptographic protocol is suitable DSQC.
Assuming ideal sources and detectors with Alice and Bob, the PoP device makes the protocol exponentially sensitive
to Eve’s intervention. Suppose Eve chooses to attack fraction f of n pairs of particles transmitted. Let m ≡ bnfc is
an integer. The probability that the m particles are pair-wise closed (i.e., every particle’s twin is within the attacked
group) is pclosed ≡
(
n
m
)(
2n
2m
)−1
while the probability that all selected m particles are correctly paired by Eve in
the closed group is ppair =
1
m−1
1
m−3 · · · 13 . Thus the probability Eve’s attack produces no error is pclosedppair, which
is exponentially small.
In our protocol, the efficiency of 13 , can be improved upon in practice if the observed noise level remains stable
over sufficiently many runs, and thus fewer quantum resources need to be sacrificed to determine it. Our protocol as
stated makes no such assumption about the noise, and thus considers the worst case scenario. Consequently, in every
transmission step, we have used half of the transmission qubits for error checking. The statistics of random sampling
then guarantees that the probability that the fraction of errors observed in the check bits deviates from the error
fraction in the code bits, is exponentially low [27].
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
A two-particle QSDC protocol has been proposed, with the motivation of understanding the similarity and difference
between the origins of security in GV and a multi-particle orthogonal-state based cryptography scheme. It may be
noted that 2GV is technically similar to CORE QKD protocol [23]– with added ideas (block transmission technique)
from Ref. [15]– rather than to GV. A non-trivial difference between the two situations was noted. 2GV uses internal
degrees of freedom, while GV uses the spatial degree of freedom, as a result of which the nature of the information-
vs-disturbance trade-off and the options available to Eve are quite different, apart from the obvious difference due
to employing different numbers of particles. The PoP technique is crucial to 2GV, while it can optionally be used
to enhance security of GV. However, for GV, it suffices to increase the parameter γ, which is experimentally easy to
implement.
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